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Liberty of Ecological Conscience
Aaron Lercher*
Our concern for nonhuman nature can be justified in terms of a human right to
liberty of ecological conscience. This right is analogous to the right to religious
liberty, and is equally worthy of recognition as that fundamental liberty. The
liberty of ecological conscience, like religious liberty, is a negative right against
interference. Each ecological conscience supports a claim to protection of the
parts of nonhuman nature that are current or potential sites of its active pursuit
of natural value. If we acknowledge the fallibility of each conscience in its pursuit
of genuine natural value, a policy of indefinitely extensive conservation can be
justified. Destruction of an obiect of current or potential natural value is like
destroying a church, mosque, temple, or other holy place. This justification for
environmental conservation is analogous to the standard justification for indi,
and Rawls.
vidual negative rights, as upheld by the liberal tradition of ~ o c k eMill,

I. OUR ECOLOGICAL CONSCIENCES
It is plausible to think that if we arrived at a clear and persuasive account of
what is valuable in nature, it would justify conservation and show how to
improve the human relationship with the rest of nature. Of course, it would be
good to get it right. But in this paper, I argue instead that to some extent it may
not matter. The fallibility of our ethical understanding itself justifies conservation and improvement of the human relationship with nature.
One (frankly anthropocentric) way of discussing the value of nature is to ask:
Is there a human right to the pursuit of natural value? But we do not seem able
to answer this question without also explaining what natural value is, so we do
not seem to have gained any perspective on the central issue of environmental
ethics by talking about a human right to natural value.
We can, however, look at the adjacent issue of interference with the pursuit
of natural value. In this paper, I assume there is a human right against interference
with pursuit of natural value. (At the end of the paper, I return to the contrast
between rights "to" and rights "against.") I argue that such a negative right against
interference in the pursuit of natural value is a reasonable extension of religious
liberty. Destruction of a part of nature actually or potentially of value to human
beings is analogous to destruction of a church.
This argument begins by considering the human capability of having an idea
of natural value and pursuing this as a human end. I call this capability our
"ecological conscience." It is reasonable to assume that each of us has an
ecological conscience. In other words, each of us is capable of understanding

* 345 Richmond Avenue, Buffalo, NY 14222. Lercher's research interests include environmental philosophy and philosophy of mathematics and logic. He is the author of "Is Anyone to
Blame for Pollution?" Environmental Ethics 26 (2004): 403-10.
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and learning from nature that there are valuable aspects of nature and each of
us is capable of acting on this understanding. But for different people there are
varying degrees to which this capability is active.
We can also reasonably assume that each human being can develop his or her
ecological conscience by learning more about nature. That is, we assume that
the ecological conscience of each human being is fallible, that each human
being recognizes the fallibility of his or herjudgment about value in nature, and
is interested in correcting his or her mistakes. These assumptions, I believe, are
necessary for any environmental ethical view. They indicate that we can learn
from nature about how rightly to act with respect to nature, that we are interested
in doing so, and that we might be wrong about doing so.
My argument in this paper begins with detailed discussion of a case in which
I make two simplifying assumptions. First I look at a case in which all the
human beings- involved have active ecological consciences and these consciences are the major motivating factor of these people. Actually, most
ecological consciences are not very active. But I assume that everyone is
capable of enlarging the activity of his or her ecological conscience by learning
from nature. As we learn about natural value and correct our fallibly mistaken
and partial views of what is valuable in nature, human beings can find natural
value in an indefinitely great number of different natural objects. Our ethical
understanding is fallible, but we do not know what aspects of nature will offer
the opportunity to correct our mistakes. To an indefinitely wide extent, then,
conservation of nature is justified as rational for each of us.
11. ACTIVE ECOLOGICAL CONSCIENCES

Consider three people who have active, but different, ecological consciences. Each of them represents a stereotypical ecological attitude, so let us
call them characters, as in a story. One is a hunter, another an animal advocate,
and yet another is a wildlife manager for a park in which the hunter hunts deer.
Each of these has a definite idea about what aspects of nature are valuable.
Since their consciences are active, for each character, his or her ecological
conscience is tied to practices, which are tied to the aspects of nature to which
each conscience is directed. In the case of the hunter, he or she seeks aperfected
experience of being a hunter. That is, the hunter cultivates the virtues of
patience, stealth, and accuracy that a predator requires. Of course, the cultivation of these qualities is confirmed by a kill. However, for this idealized character
of a hunter, the trophy is not the hunter's goal, as much as it is to become a really
good predator, and in that way to embrace the forest and a connection with the
prey that is as intimate as life and death.
The animal advocate considers the hunter's behavior to be cruel and unfair.
The hunter is an animal himself or herself, but guns give the hunter an unfair
technological advantage. Unlike other predators, the hunter could choose not
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to hunt, and so the choice to hunt is cruel. The animal advocate's goal is to put
all animals on an equal footing. Human exclusion of competing predators is
unfair, so wolves should be reintroduced to the forest. (I assume that wolves
have been hunted and driven away from the forest.)
To the wildlife manager, the animal advocate's focus on the well-being of a
few animals is a distraction from the proper aim of preserving the integrity of
the forest ecosystem. The wildlife manager is not interested in predatory
virtues. Deer threaten certain plant populations unless their numbers are
controlled. The animal advocate wants to protect some land with a fence, but
that does not help either the deer or the ecosystem on which the deer depend.
Wolves are part of the answer, but hunting is more popular than wolves. It is
a good political compromise to use hunting to control deer population, and it
is immediately effective. Hunting is haphazard, however, since hunters tend to
stay close to roads. The solution is commercial hunting, spread out to kill deer
systematically.
Each of these characters, then, has a characteristic way of seeking the good
in nature as he or she sees it. Each has an ecological conscience and acts on it.
The hunter seeks the predatory virtues and to achieve the predator's embrace
of nature. The animal advocate seeks the well-being of all animals, and a fair
treatment of animals. The wildlife manager seeks to preserve the integrity of
the forest ecosystem and is willing to take the most efficient means to this end.
But we have assumed that our ecological consciences are fallible and can
develop as we learn more about nature. Thus, these characters' understanding
of the value of nature is not static. Aldo Leopold says that the "first precaution
of intelligent tinkering" is "to save every cog and wheel."' But what is
intelligent tinkering? It may not be possible to define it without getting caught
in the circle in which intelligence preserves what is good in nature and
preserving what is good in nature is intelligent. Nevertheless, it is clear that
Leopold's metaphor portrays the human relationship with nonhuman nature as
actively developing in response to new knowledge about what is valuable.
The hunter may learn to think about the beauty and other good qualities of
animals besides deer. In particular, the hunter wants to perfect the predatory
virtues of patience, stealth, and accuracy. So the hunter can learn from wolves,
if these are reintroduced to the forest. For this to happen, the animal advocate
may be involved. But we assume only that the hunter learns to deepen his
understanding of the predatory virtues from observing wolves, and not from
hearing from the animal advocate. Perhaps the animal advocate points to
something not previously noticed, but that is not essential.
Animal advocates can learn about predation. As the animal advocate learns
to appreciate this aspect of nature, it may turn out that the hunter's activities

'

Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac: With Essays on Conservation from Round River
(New York: Ballantine, 1970). p. 188.
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are a good example of the predatory virtues of patience, stealth, and accuracy,
especially if the hunter has given up technological overkill. Identifying with
the wolf and mimicking its behavior is a way of learning what the wolf is really
like. At least theoretically, the animal advocate can learn through observation
how hunting is not inherently wrong, even if it is usually done wrongly.
Both the hunter and the animal advocate could learn that there is more to the
forest than deer and wolves. The wildlife manager can make this point, but we
need only assume that hunters and animal advocates can learn it from observation of nature. But the wildlife manager's technique may in turn be improved
by treating forest animals as more than parts of a ecological mechanism. Again,
the hunter and animal advocate may point this out, but we need only assume
that the wildlife manager can learn this from observation.
Since each character has a fallible ecological conscience, none of the characters knows whether he or she will need the insight provided by the aspects of
nature beloved by the others. Since each recognizes his or her fallibility, and
is interested in improving his or her ethical understanding, each has an interest
in preserving the opportunities to develop his or her conscience. We have seen
that the wolves admired by the animal advocate may be precisely what the
hunter needs to learn from, in order to develop the hunter's own sense of natural
value. The hunter's predatory virtues may, conversely, be precisely what the
animal advocate needs to learn from, in order to advance the animal advocate's
own sense of natural value.
Now we can see that a policy of toleration of ecological conscience is
rational for each character. Toleration of the liberty of ecological conscience
is a policy of restraint from interference in the active ecological consciences
of the others. Each character has an interest in tolerance because he or she has
an interest in preserving opportunities for learning and revising his or her
ethical understanding.
Because an active ecological conscience depends on preserving the aspects
of nature to which the conscience is devoted, tolerance by any of the characters
demands preservation of the aspects of the nature to which other characters'
consciences are devoted. Toleration thus demands wider preservation than any
one individual conscience may require.
How far might such toleration extend? Not necessarily as far as we might
want. It extends only as far as aspects of nature that might be recognized as
valuable by someone. But we can extend it by stating toleration as a general
policy, applying tolerance to developing ecological consciences. Since we
assume that each ecological conscience is fallible and capable of extension,
tolerance of active and developing ecological consciences requires a general
policy that we should preserve a natural object if it provides what Bryan Norton
calls "an occasion for examining or altering felt preference[s]."2 That is,
2Bryan Norton, Why Preserve Natural Variety? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987),
p. 10.
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toleration of ecological consciences as a general policy requires preservation
of objects with what Norton calls "transformative value."
111. CONFLICTING INTERESTS
Thus far, the hunter, the animal advocate, and the wildlife manager have each
found that it is rational to agree not to interfere with the others' pursuit of
natural value. Thus, conservation of nature can be justified to an indefinitely
wide extent in order to offer scope for the exercise of a human capability of
understanding and learning about natural value and of acting on this understanding. But this view is frankly anthropocentric, and it may come into
conflict with the value we may consider to belong intrinsically to nonhuman
animals.
Suppose, for example, that the three characters are shipwrecked on a barren
island, together with a dog.3 The island provides no food, but the three have
managed to save just enough food to last a month until the next ship is due to
arrive at the island. The animal advocate wants to save the dog's life. Meanwhile, however, the wildlife manager is calculating the cost in food of keeping
the dog alive. While the hunter has sympathy for the dog, the hunter does not
let that sympathy overrule the demands of survival.
This case raises a theoretical problem for any anthropocentric view. But it is
not so clear that this theoretical difficulty translates into a difficulty in practice.
If there is not enough food, then it is rational for the animal advocate to sacrifice
the dog, despite the animal advocate's sympathy. (I dismiss the option of
saving the dog by killing another human being.) But human beings and dogs are
actually rather flexible in their need for food, so the scarcity in this example is
improbable. Neverthless, natural value is generally judged to depend on
scarcity, so scarcity is not irrelevant.
Since it turns out that ethical judgment in the shipwreck case depends on the
degree of scarcity, let us consider a case in which there is a trade-off between
unique (maximally scarce) objects of value. Suppose, then, a bacteriologist is
deeply engaged in study of a particular species of bacteria. Only that particular
species has the characteristics that the bacteriologist seeks to understand.
Unfortunately, this species of bacteria grows parasitically on the bacteriologist's
baby daughter, and it is killing her. The bacteriologist has an antibiotic that will
kill the bacteria, wiping out the species and destroying the bacteriologist's life
work.
This case pits a uniquely valuable predator against a uniquely valuable prey.
We need not and should not suppose that the right against interference with the
pursuit of natural value is absolute. But that is not surprising. Presumably the
bacteriologist should save his daughter. The bacteriologist has many reasons
This example is adapted from Michael Pritchard and Wade Robison, "Justice and the Treatment
of Animals," Environmental Ethics 3 (1981): 55-61.
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to favor his daughter over the bacteria. I think it is unlikely that we will find
an illuminating example pitting the value of human life against the value of
nonhuman life, but I am not certain.
This example does not address the theoretical problem, and my response
relies on my ethical intuition in this particular case. Such intuitions are fallible
and subject to revision as a result of theoretical reflection and comparison of
cases. Ethical inquiry is based on an evidence base that changes as some
evidence is found to be unreliable, and new evidence is found. Nonanthropocentric ethical views will have similar difficulties in weighing the values of
competing species, or the values of individual organisms against the values of
their ecosystems. The account of natural value in this paper shows that there
is a broad area in which familiar anthropocentric ideas can guide us. But the
best we can do in some cases is to recognize in our theorizing that ethical
theories and intuitions are fallible.
Let us now consider a case involving two nonhuman objects of natural value.
Suppose that there are two endangered species that occupy the same ecological
niche in similar ecosystems in different parts of the world. The remaining
habitat of one of the endangered species is about to be destroyed, leaving that
species extinct. We can, however, transplant the remaining members of the
species whose habitat is about to be destroyed into the habitat of the other
endangered species. Since they occupy the same niche, the transplant will
survive, but at the cost of the other endangered species.
Is there any preference as to which species to save? I think there is. Both
species are presumed to be equally valuable. But since transplanting the
species is interference with the human right of those who esteem the current
occupant of the habitat, it is wrong. Of course, whoever destroys the habitat of
the species requiring transplant also violates the rights of those who esteem it,
but that is a different issue.
IV. RAWLS AND NEGATIVE RIGHTS
In this paper, I have followed a well-trodden path. A familiar argument
against interference with liberty of conscience is based on the fallibility of our
religious belief^.^ Many human beings see their ultimate purposes and ends as
described by their religions, but they disagree sharply about religious matters
they care so deeply about. But each of us is fallible in our knowledge of
religious truth. Thus, it is rational for each of us to agree not to interfere with
the religious beliefs and practices of others, in order to preserve some basis for

This argument is found in John Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration and John Stuart Mill,
On Liberty, chap. 2 . John Rawls' versions of the argument are inA Theory of Justice (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1971). pp. 205-1 1 (sec. 33) and Political Liberalism (New York:
Columbia University Press. 1996). pp. 31&14 (lecture 7, sec. 5).
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learning and possibly changing our minds. Further, it is plausible that religious
belief and practice are supported by toleration of diverse beliefs and practices.
In this paper, this traditional argument against interference with liberty of
religious conscience is adapted to defend liberty of ecological conscience.
Since John Rawls represents this liberal tradition now, it is useful to note
how the ecological conscience fits with Rawls' influential theory of justice.
Rawls assumes that persons have two fundamental "moral powers," the second
of which is the ability to frame an idea of one's final ends and aims, and how
these fit into the world.5 Included among such ideas of final ends and aims are
religious ideas. In the original position, the parties agreeing to the social
contract do not know their own ideas of their final ends and aims. Thus, Rawls
argues, it is rational for them to agree to refrain from interference in religious
practice and belief. Rawls' theory can be extended in a reasonable way by
stipulating that the ecological conscience is part of the second moral power.6
Laws protecting endangered species and treasured lands then should be placed
among the "basic structure" of ethically fundamental institutions.
In this paper, I emphasize the fallibility of ethical judgment, whereas Rawls'
argument is based on the hypothesis of the ignorance of the parties of the social
contract. The methodological context of Rawls' arguments is his constructivism,
which allows for ethical judgments to be erroneous in a practical sense without
being false.7 If instead we treat all ethical judgments realistically as true or
false, we can arrive at ethical judgments by whatever method is appropriate.
Thus, I believe it is appropriate to appeal to ethical intuitions in response to
cases that pit human lives against the value of nonhuman nature. Rawls'
methodology, however, makes it complicated for him in such cases. Nonhuman animals are unable to join the discussion in the original position. But
human beings in other societies likewise lack such representation and according to Rawls this lack does not leave them without ethical significance in the
hypothetical deliberation.* Thus, we should not hastily reject the possibility of
extending Rawls' contract to an agreement to protect nonhuman nature, particularly if the parties' ecological consciences are built into our reasoning from the
original position.
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 12, 19; Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 19.81, 1 0 3 4 4 . 3 0 2 .
Brent Singer makes the same point in different terms in "An Extension of Rawls' Theory of
Justice to Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 10 (1988): 217-31.
In Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 90-99, Rawls distinguishes the practical claims of his
theory from theoretical claims to ethical truth. Doing so serves to distinguish his theory as purely
"political" rather than comprehensive. In a constructive treatment of ecological value, we need
a point of consensus among different claims about the ethical truth concerning nature. I suggest
we can find such consensus on the assumption of a capability of recognizing natural value.
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). Martha
Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disabilify, Nationality, and Species Membership (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2006). discusses the problems of membership in Rawls' contractual
group.
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Tradition and the experience of religious conflict support the historical
priority of a right against interference with liberty of conscience. Rights against
interference are also conceptually prior to rights to any particular thing.9 In this
paper, I have argued that a negative right exists against interference with our
ecological consciences, and I have argued that it can justify conservation of
nonhuman nature. But in order to make the argument that rights of some kind
exist, such as environmental rights, the strength of the argument depends on
how these rights are construed. Tim Hayward argues that environmental rights
are equally worthy of recognition in state constitutions as other well-recognized rights.1° But Hayward wavers on whether environmental rights are
positive or negative. I suggest that it is stronger to argue that environmental
rights are equally worthy of recognition as the negative rights with the best
status of recognition, such as that of religious liberty.
The right to any particular religious practice follows from the right against
interference with liberty of conscience. The conclusion in this paper goes
somewhat further than liberty of conscience, since we assume that each
ecological conscience is actively engaged with the aspects of nature to which
it is devoted. But it is often argued that religious toleration fosters religious
practice. I claim analogously that a policy of toleration of ecological conscience is a basis for supporting natural preservation. Religious liberty protects
churches, mosques, temples, and other holy places. Analogously, liberty of
ecological conscience protects nonhuman nature.
Rather than hoping to find the correct human stance toward the rest of nature,
the argument in this paper starts only with the assumption that each character
is capable of some stance toward nature. Rather than attempting to state the
proper human teleology with respect to the rest of nature, the argument here
assumes only that each human is capable of a conception of the good of nature.
From these assumptions we arrive at the conclusion that we ought to support
a policy of preserving an indefinitely extensive portion of nature.

H. L. A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?" PhilosophicdReview 64 (1955): 175-91,
argues that the "general" or defensive rights of freedom from interference (the "natural" rights
referred to in the title of the paper) are needed in order to justify "special" rights that do interfere
with the freedom of others.
'O Tim Hayward, Constitutional Environmental Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005).

